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A non-embracing consequence relation is one such that no set of wffs
closed under it is equal to the set of all wffs. I prove that these relations
have no deductive power if they are also extensive and monotonic.
Let α, β, ... stand for sentences of a set L of wffs. L can be inductively defined
in the usual way, although we are not going to presuppose any particular
definition. Also let A,B, ... stand for subsets of L, which may be finite or
not. A consequence relation `: ℘L×L has in its extension those pairs 〈A, α〉,
such that α is a logical consequence of A. The expression 〈A, α〉 ∈ ` is
usually abbreviated by A ` α. Finally, the consequence set of A, or A`, is
just the set of all the logical consequences of A.
Definition 1. A` = {α | A ` α}
For now, let us only consider the following properties of `.
Axiom 2 (Extension). A ⊆ A`
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity). A` ⊆ (A ∪B)`
Corollary 4. A ⊆ B⇒ A` ⊆ B` {3}
Languages with negation usually have other properties concerning con-
sistent and trivial sets, which I will define as follows:
Definition 5 (Consistency). A is consistent ⇔ α,¬α ∈ A holds for no α,
and inconsistent otherwise.
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Definition 6 (Triviality). A is trivial ⇔ A = L.
To assert a trivial set of statements is the same as asserting everything
and nothing, which justifies us in regarding any such assertion as absurd [1].
The principle of explosion transfers this absurdity to inconsistent sets since,
according to it, ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ), i.e. anything
follows from a contradiction. Consequently, any formula whatsoever follows
from an inconsistent set.
Postulate ECQ (Explosion). A` = L, for any inconsistent A.
Postulate ECQ has been questioned both on philosophical and logical
grounds. These criticisms reached their highest point with the formulation of
formal systems of logic that restricted its validity: the so-called paraconsistent
logics. Such logics may be characterised by the following postulate, which is
just the negation of ECQ.
Postulate P (Paraconsistency). A` 6= L, for some inconsistent A.
This postulate does not forbid that some inconsistent sets satisfy ECQ,
for it only requires that at least one does not. And yet, we can define a
class of logics where it is impossible to trivialise a set on grounds of it being
inconsistent. Following Perzanowski’s [3] terminology, these may be called
strongly paraconsistent logics.
Postulate SP (Strong paraconsistency). {α,¬α}` 6= L
Postulate SP does not completely rule out trivialisation. In principle, for
every set A there could be some sophisticated wff α capable of trivialising it,
that is, such that (A ∪ α)` = L. For example, in the paraconsistent calcu-
lus C1 of da Costa [2], a set A such that A ` ∗¬α could be trivialised by α.
Notwithstanding that, this postulate suggests an even stronger principle that
would make it impossible to trivialise any set. Following Popper [4], I will
call this the principle of non embracingness.
Postulate E¯ (Non embracingness). A` 6= L, for all A ⊂ L.
It clearly follows from this that no A obtained by subtracting a singleton
from L can entail formula that is not already a member of A.
Lemma 7. L−A is a singleton ⇒ A` = A. {2, 3, E¯}
Proof. Assuming that L −A results in that A ⊆ L and that L −A is not
empty. From these, it follows that A ⊂ L, which by postulate E¯ entails
that A` 6= L. This, by extension, entails that A` = A.
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This lemma extends to every subset of L.
Theorem 8. A` = A {2, 3, E¯}
Proof. In order for A` = A not to hold in general, there needs to exist at
least one A for which there is at least one α /∈ A such that A ` α. If A
and α are such, then we have that A ⊆ L−{α}. From this, corollary 4 guar-
antees that A` ⊆ (L− {α})`, which implies that L−{α} ` α, contradicting
lemma 7. Hence, no A entails an α that is not already a member of it.
This leads to the general result that a non-embracing relation of conse-
quence satisfying monotonicity (and extension) has no deductive power, for
it can only deduce as a theorem what already is a premise. In such case,
what we may call the principle of embracingness would be essential in the
realm of monotonic logics, where everything must follow from something.
We can, of course, restrict non-embracingness only to finite subsets of L.
This would make sense on intuitionistic grounds, since it does not seem plau-
sible that a consequence relation, intended to formalise finitistic reasoning,
can be applied to any arbitrary finite set. Whether intuitionism can offer a
new opportunity for monotonicity and embracingness, or whether this theo-
rem holds outside of the realm of monotonicity requires further research.
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